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Abstract
Do lobbies aﬀect technology diﬀusion and growth? A number of au-
thors have identiﬁed the importance of vested interests as a deterrent to
technology diﬀusion and the relevance that this may have for growth.
however, the evidence that exists about this mechanism is just anecdotal.
In this paper we build a model of lobbying and technology diﬀusion where
the speed of diﬀusion of new technologies depends on some dimensions of
the political regime and on the whether there is an old technology that
may be substituted by the new technology. This diﬀerential eﬀect of in-
stitutions on the diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor constitutes
the central element of our identiﬁcation strategy. To implement this test
we use technology diﬀusion data from Comin and Hobijn [2004]. We ﬁnd
that the relevant institutional variables have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the
diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor technology as predicted by
the theory. We show that this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted
variables, or reverse causality.
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11 Motivation
The presence of political barriers to the adoption of new technologies is believed
to be a ﬁrst order determinant of underdevelopment. The connection between
lobbying and technology diﬀusion works as follows: Some group of agents have
a vested interest that is put in jeopardy by the diﬀusion of some new technology.
The diﬀusion of the new technology, though, is socially desirable. To preserve
their private beneﬁts, they engage in some kind of activity to deter the diﬀusion
of the new technology.
The diﬀerent theoretical contributions to the literature diﬀer in the nature of
the rents and on the tools that the groups have to deter technology diﬀusion. In
Krusell and Rios Rull [1996], the rents are associated to the speciﬁcity of human
capital and the deterrence mechanism is the democratic election of a party that
forbids the use of the technology. Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] associate the
diﬀusion of the new technology to the lost of power for the political authority.
This in turn can bar the diﬀusion of the new technology. In this paper, the
producers of technological goods associated to an old technology may continue
being competitive if the legislative authority taxes the goods produced with
new technologies. To induce the legislative authority to raise these barriers, the
lobby of the old technology goods can oﬀer the authority conditional (monetary)
contributions.
More speciﬁcally, a technology in our model consists on a set of intermediate
goods that are used together. The producers of goods associated to a technol-
ogy organize themselves in a guild that can oﬀer conditional contributions to a
legislative authority that can regulate on the sales tax rate for the new technol-
ogy goods. Based on the technological superiority of the new technology, on the
number of goods associated to each technology and on the sales tax rate for the
new technology goods, the consumers of the technological goods decide which
technology to use.
In this context, it is crucial to make a distinction between those technologies
with and without a previous technology that they can substitute. When the
new technology does not have such a predecessor technology, nobody has the
incentives to lobby the legislative authority to raise barriers to the diﬀusion of
the new technology. In these instances the new technology will diﬀuse quickly.
If instead the new technology has a predecessor technology, the lobby of
producers associated to the old technology may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to coordinate
a conditional contribution to induce the legislative authority to raise the sales
tax faced by the new technology. Whether these lobbying eﬀorts are successful
will depend on the costs faced by the legislative authority to pass the regula-
tion. These costs are of two types. There may be a static cost of raising such
barriers that probably is lower the more ﬂexibility the legislative authority has.
In addition, the probability that the current legislative authority continues in
oﬃce in the future may be reduced by passing welfare reducing regulations such
as the creation of barriers against new technologies. Interestingly, the size of
t h es t a t i ca n dd y n a m i cc o s t sd e p e n d so nd i ﬀerent dimensions of the political
regime such as the independence of the legislators and whether the regime is
2democratic. When the political regime makes lobbying successful, our model
predicts that the barriers raised by the legislative authority may be suﬃcient
to delay the diﬀusion of new technologies that have a predecessor technology.
This diﬀerence in the predicted diﬀusion patterns of new technologies that have
or lack a predecessor substitute technology is central to our empirical strategy.
Despite the theoretical appeal of the hypothesis that lobbies are bad for
technology diﬀusion, all the evidence we have so far is anecdotal.1 In this paper,
we are interested in going beyond the existing anecdotal evidence and trying to
assess clearly the empirical importance of lobbies for technology diﬀusion. The
lack of a systematic eﬀort to answer this question is surely the consequence of
two important diﬃculties. First, it is very hard to obtain good measures of the
size of these barriers. Second, many of the determinants of the size of political
barriers may have independent eﬀects on development, may be endogenous and
most likely are correlated to other variables that aﬀect the development of the
country.
The strategy we propose and implement in this paper consists on identifying
the eﬀect of political barriers on development by estimating the diﬀerent eﬀect
across technologies that some of the country-level variables that according to our
theory aﬀect the size of the barriers have. This strategy avoids the complexity
of measuring the intensity of lobbying directly because it uses the theory to
determine the political regimes and technologies where there should be lobbying.
By inspecting the diﬀerential eﬀect of these determinants of lobbying on the
diﬀusion of certain technologies we believe that we avoid most of the traditional
identiﬁcation problems.2
More speciﬁcally, we take the measures of technology diﬀusion from the
Historical Cross-Country Technology Adoption (HCCTA) data set that we in-
troduced in Comin and Hobijn [2003]. This data set contains historical data
on the adoption of 25 technologies over the last 215 years for 23 of the World’s
leading industrial economies. The technologies in our sample cover eight sec-
tors (i) textiles, (ii) steel, (iii) telecommunication, (iv) mass communication,
(v) information technology, (vi) transportation (rail-, road-, and airways), (vii)
transportation (shipping), and (viii) electricity. Having this large coverage of
sectors increases the representativeness of our results. Further, the long time
series allows us to have signiﬁcant variation in the political variables despite the
fact that our sample only covers OECD economies.
In our regressions we control for technological elements that aﬀect the diﬀu-
sion of each technology with a set of time and technology speciﬁc dummies. In
addition we include a set of controls such as income per capita, enrollment rates,
country speciﬁc dummies and variables that measure various dimensions of the
political regime. These variables capture determinants of technology adoption
others than lobbies. Yet, probably, there are other variables that may have an
1See for example Mokyr [1990] for numerous annecdotes that support the hypothesis.
2Rajan and Zingales [1998] use a similar strategy to identifythe eﬀect of capital markets
development on economic development. One important methodological diﬀerence though is
that while they have various measures of capital market development (the exogenous variable
in their test), we do not have any direct measure of lobbying intensity.
3eﬀect on technology diﬀusion and may be correlated to the regime variables
that, according to the theory, aﬀect lobbying activity. To overcome the pos-
sibility of such an omitted variable bias and successfully identify the eﬀect of
lobbies on technology diﬀusion we focus on the diﬀerential eﬀect that institu-
tional variables have on the diﬀusion of the technologies with a technological
predecessor.
There are three virtues to this simple test. First, it focuses on the details of
the mechanism by which lobbying aﬀects technology diﬀusion, thus providing a
stronger test of causality. Second, while it may be relatively easy to think oﬀ
omitted correlates of the institutional variables that conceivably may have an
independent eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies, it is very complicated to ﬁnd
reasons why these correlates should have an eﬀect on the group of technologies
with a predecessor technology above and beyond the eﬀect they have on the
technologies without one. This challenge is even more daunting given that we
have a set of technology and time speciﬁc dummies as regressors and since
most of the sectors represented in our sample have technologies in both groups.
Similarly, reverse causality is probably not an issue because it is hard to argue
that relatively micro technologies like the ones in our sample may have an eﬀect
on the institutions of a country. Further, for this eﬀect on the institutional
variables to invalidate our identiﬁcation strategy, it must be relevant above and
beyond our controls and must be triggered only by the diﬀusion of technologies
with or without a technological predecessor.
The results from our analysis provide strong support for the negative eﬀect
of lobbying on technology diﬀusion. We ﬁnd that each and every of our measures
of the political environment and regime has a signiﬁcantly stronger eﬀect on the
diﬀusion of technologies with a competing predecessor than in the cases where
there is no such an incumbent technology. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that in countries
where the legislative authorities have more ﬂexibility, in closed economies, in
countries with a non-democratic eﬀective executive or with a military regime
technologies with a technological predecessor that may be substituted by the
new technology diﬀuse more slowly than technologies without such a predeces-
sor technology. These eﬀects are not only signiﬁcant but also quantitatively
important to understand technology diﬀusion.
From this results we are inclined to conclude that the barriers raised by
lobbies to deter the diﬀusion of new technologies are an important determinant
of the speed of diﬀusion of technologies. Further, since technology diﬀusion
is an important determinant of growth, our identiﬁcation strategy also serves
to pinpoint a speciﬁc mechanism by which certain dimensions of institutions
aﬀect growth. Namely, through the eﬀect institutions have in inducing lobbying
activities which may slowdown the speed of diﬀusion of technologies.
The rest of the paper is divided in section 2 that contains the model and
section 3 that contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
42 The model
Our model is a simple and ﬂexible theoretical structure that allows us to un-
derstand the interaction between old and new technology producers, lobbies,
the legislative authority in various political systems and how these aﬀect the
diﬀusion of new technologies.
2.1 Setting
Sectors- In the economy there are two types of sectors that diﬀer in how many
technologies are available to produce their output. In new sectors only a new
technology is available, while in old sectors, ﬁrms can use either a new or an old
technology. Let Y be the sectorial output. In a new sector,
Y = dXα
e ,
where d>1, α ∈ (0,1) and Xe is a composite of ne intermediate goods associ-






ejdj)1/ρ, with ρ ∈ (0,1).
In an old sector, output is given by the following production function:
Y =m a x {Xα
i ,dXα
e },
where Xe takes the same form as above and Xi is a composite of the ni inter-







Intermediate goods- Each intermediate good is produced by one and only one
producer. This exclusivity allows intermediate goods producers to charge a price
above the marginal cost of production, a. For intermediate goods associated to
the old technology, a is equal to ¯ a units of ﬁnal output. For goods associated to
the new technology a is initially equal to ¯ a but with a (per-period) probability µ,
intermediate goods ﬁrms learn the production possibilities of the new technology
and the marginal cost of production for all the ﬁrms associated to the new
technology is permanently reduced to a
¯
.
In addition to the marginal cost of production, intermediate goods ﬁrms
have to incur every period in an operating cost of o units of sectorial output
before they start producing.
Guilds- All the intermediate goods producers that operate with a given tech-
nology are associated in guilds. Guilds are inﬁnitely-lived entities that maximize
the present discounted value of its members. They oﬀer one period contingent
contributions to the legislative parties in order to aﬀect the legislations that
determine the operating costs for the new technology ﬁrms.
5There is an important asymmetry between the guilds of the old and the
new technologies. The old technology guild exists before the new technology
arrives. As a result, before the new technology guild has been constituted, the
old technology guild can start making contributions to the legislative authority
in order to lobby for a tax (τ) on the price of the intermediate goods linked to
the new technology.
Institutions- The legislative institution determines the level of the sales tax
(τ) on the intermediate goods linked to the new technology. This can take two
values: 0 and ¯ τ > 0.3 The static payoﬀ of the legislative institution is the sum
of three terms: a private value of being in power (b), the total contribution
perceived from the guilds (C) and the costs of bending the political constraints
imposed by other institutions (S). S depends on the implemented operating
costs and on the political system. There is no political constraint when im-
plementing τ =0( i.e. S(τ = 0) = 0). The cost of implementing ¯ τ depends
on the independence of the legislative institution. An independent legislative
institution can implement the high level of taxes at a cost s
¯
lower than the cost
of implementing τ =¯ τ by a constrained legislative institution: ¯ s.
The decisions taken by the legislative institution also may aﬀect the proba-
bility of remaining in power the next period. We model this eﬀect by making
the discount rate a function of the operating cost induced by the legislative in-
stitution and of the political regimes. For the time being, we conjecture that in
democratic regimes, the continuation of the legislative institution depends to a
larger extent than in non-democratic regimes on the legislation it has passed.4
To simplify the notation, we assume that the discount factor faced by the leg-
islative agent that has decided to implement ¯ τ in a democratic regime is ˆ β, lower
than the discount factor faced in the rest of scenarios and by the other entities
in the economy: β. Later we elaborate more on this interpretation.
Timing- The timing of the stage game is as follows:
After having observed the tax level set on the price of intermediate goods
associated to the new technology and the marginal cost of producing them:
0. ae is realized.
1. The lobby of the intermediate goods ﬁrms in the old technology announces
the contribution scheme contingent on a,τ and τ0.
2. Lobby e announces the contribution scheme contingent on a,τ and τ0.
3. Firms decide whether to pay the operating cost o and contributions.
Production takes place.
4. Legislative authority decides next period’s sales tax on the intermediate
goods of the new technologies and passes the legislation necessary to implement
this level.
3The feasibility of only two tax rates may be completely general if, as in Acemoglu and
Robinson [1998], there is an informal sector where producers can avoid the sales taxes but
operate at lower productivity. ¯ τ would then be the rate that makes the producer indiﬀerent
between operating in the two sectors.
4In section 2.3 we extend the model to allow for a reelection of the legislative authority
and show that this is the case.
65. Guilds make eﬀective the promised contributions and the legislative au-
thority observes whether it will continue being in power next period.
This stage game is repeated inﬁnitely.
Commitment technology-W ea s s u m et h a tg u i l d sc a nc o m m i tt ot h ec o n t i n -
gent contributions they make within the period and that the legislative institu-
tion cannot change the legislation passed until next period.
We use this setting to investigate the eﬀect of three elements on the speed
of diﬀusion of new technologies. These are: i) the presence or absence of a prior
technology, ii) the ﬂexibility of the legislative authority measured by S(¯ τ), and
iii) the insensitivity of the persistence in power to the barriers raised measured
by β(¯ τ).
2.2 Analysis
We study ﬁrst the diﬀu s i o np a t t e r n si nas e c t o rw i thout an old technology and
then use this as a benchmark to investigate the eﬀects of having an incumbent
technology. The equilibrium concept we use to solve this game is Markov Perfect
Equilibrium.
2.2.1 Case 1: No incumbent technology
Production, proﬁts and entry- In a new sector, output will be produced with
the new technology because it is the only technology available. Let’s normalize













is the price of one unit of the intermedi-
ate good composite XE. The demand faced by each intermediate good producer
is:
xej = XE (pE/pej)
1/(1−ρ) , (2)
where pej is the price of the intermediate good gross of sales taxes, τ.O p t i m a l
pricing by intermediate goods producers implies that pej =( 1 + τ)ae/ρ. Plugging






It is then straightforward to solve for the operating proﬁts of the ﬁnal (ΠE)
and of an intermediate goods (πe) producers:
ΠE = dXα
























7Foreseeing these proﬁts, intermediate goods ﬁrms decide whether to incur
in the operating costs o and in the contributions to the lobby co.N o t et h a tπe
may be increasing or decreasing in ne depending on whether ρ is smaller than
α.5
Assumption 1: In what follows we assume that ρ > α. This pins down the
number of ﬁrms using the new technology:
ne =

(1/((1 + τ)ρ) − 1)a
−α
1−α









Guilds’ contributions- The value of the new technology guild V e, is a function
of the sales tax for the intermediate goods ﬁrms (τ) and of their current marginal
cost of production (a). This value can be deﬁned recursively as:
V e(τ,a)=m a x
ce
(πej − ce)neo + βEV e (Υ(τ,a,c e),a 0),
where Υ(τ,a,c e) is the policy function of the legislative authority that the guilds
take as given and the expectations are taken with respect to a0.
Legislative choices- The legislative authority decides the operating costs of
the entrants taking as given the contribution schemes and the political regime.
The value of the legislative authority can be deﬁned as:
W(τ,a,c e)=m a x
τ0 b + ne(τ,a,c e(τ0))ce(τ0)o − S(τ0)+β(τ0)EW(τ0,a 0,c 0
e)
Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this inﬁnitely repeated game is a policy
function for the guild, ce(τ,a,τ0), and a policy function for the legislative au-
thority Υ(τ,a,c e)s u c ht h a t :
• ce(.) solves the guild problem for all (τ,a,τ0) taking as given τ0(.).
• Υ(.) solves the legislative authority problem for all (τ,a,c e) taking as given
ce(.).
Candidate equilibrium- We consider the following strategy proﬁle: Lobby e
oﬀers ce = 0 in all the possible subgames, and the legislative authority always
sets τ equal to 0.
This strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium because: i) the lobby’s action
maximizes its value in all the possible subgames provided that τ = 0 and ii) given
the lobby contribution scheme, if the legislative authority deviates to τ =¯ τ in
any subgame, its payoﬀ would be b−S+β(¯ τ)EW(¯ τ,a 0,0) = b−S+β(¯ τ)b/(1−
5This is the case because ne reduces pE and pE has two eﬀects on the demand level
xej : one direct by which a high price level, ceteris paribus, makes more attractive the jth
intermediate good, and one indirect by which a high price level reduces the number of units
of the composite good (Xe)d e m a n d e d .
8β) <b / (1 − β) which is the legislative authority payoﬀ if he conforms with the
strategy proﬁle in the candidate equilibrium.
Proposition 1: This is the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proof: The new element in proposition 1 is the claim that the equilibrium
is unique. The proof works by contradiction. Suppose that there was another
equilibrium where the lobby makes some per member contribution to L that is
strictly positive. Is it possible to induce the lobby to pay a positive contribution
in equilibrium? Since they have the option of making zero contributions, for
the lobby to be willing to make the contribution it must be the case that the
legislative authority sets τ =¯ τ in case the contribution of the lobby is smaller
than the required level. But, can this strategy be part of a perfect equilibrium?
The answer to this question is no, because if the lobby does not make the
contribution, the best response for the legislative authority is to deviate and set
τ =0 , because in this way it avoids the cost S and the lower discount factor
β(¯ τ). Hence, any strategy proﬁle with a positive contribution is not part of
a MPE. Since there is no contribution for L, L will always set τ =0i na n y
equilibrium. Hence the only MPE is our candidate equilibrium.
Diﬀusion- Along the equilibrium path, the diﬀusion of the new technology is
immediate: The period after its introduction, the number of ﬁrms that produce














2.2.2 Case 2: Exists an incumbent technology
Production, proﬁts and entry- When there is a prior technology, ﬁnal output
ﬁrms have a technology choice. When the technology used is the new one, the
expressions for XE,x ej,p E, ΠE, πe and ne are given by expressions (1), (2),
(3), (4), (5) and (6).







The demand faced by each intermediate good producer is:
xij = XI (pI/pij)
1/(1−ρ) , (8)
where pij i st h ep r i c eo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d .O p t i m a lp r i c i n gb yi n t e r m e d i a t e







9It is then straightforward to solve for the operating proﬁts of the ﬁnal (ΠI)
and of an intermediate goods (πi) producers:
ΠI = Xα








































Lobbies’ contributions- As before, lobbies associated to the new and old
technologies oﬀer contribution schemes to the legislative authority taking as
given the contribution scheme of the other guild and the strategy followed by
the legislative authority. The value of the new (V e), and old (V i) technology
guilds are given by:
V e(τ,a)=m a x
ce
ne (πej − ce)+βEV e (Υ(τ,a,c e,c i),a 0)
V i(τ,a)=m a x
ci
ni (πij − ci)+βEV i (Υ(a,ce,c i),a 0),
where Υ(τ,a,c e,c i) is the policy function of the legislative authority and ci is
the contribution scheme of the incumbent technology guild.
Initial conditions- The presence of a prior technology introduces a funda-
mental asymmetry between the problems of the lobby for the incunbent and for
the new technologies that determines the initial state. In particular, the period
before the new technology arrives, only the old technology lobby is around. The
new technology lobby has not been created yet and it has no members (i.e.
ne = 0). This gives lobby i the opportunity to bribe L to implement τ0 =¯ τ
when the new technology is available next period. In addition, the marginal
cost of production for the intermediate goods associated to both technologies is
¯ a.
Legislative choices- The legislative authority decides the sales tax on new
intermediate goods taking as given the contribution schemes and the political
regime. Its value is
W(τ,a,c e,c i)=m a x
τ0 b + C(τ0,c e,c i) − S(τ0)+β(τ0)EW(τ0,a 0,c 0
e,c 0
i)
where C(τ0,c e,c i) is the total contribution received by the legislative au-
thority given the contribution schemes (ce and ci) and the selected sales tax for
next period (τ0 ).
Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this inﬁnitely repeated game is a policy
function for each lobby, ce(τ,a,τ0)a n dci(τ,a,τ0) and a policy function for the
legislative authority Υ(τ,a,c e,c i) such that:
10• ce(.) solves the guild problem for all (τ,a,τ0) taking as given ci(.)a n d
Υ(.).
• ci(.) solves the guild problem for all (τ,a,τ0) taking as given ce(.)a n d
Υ(.).
• Υ(.) solves the legislative authority problem for all (τ,a,c e,c i)t a k i n ga s
given ce(.)a n dci(.).
To start our search for the equilibrium, let’s consider the per member contri-








with γ ≡ ρ(1−α)/(ρ−α). Let’s cmax ≡
1/γ
1−1/γ. This is the level of contribution
that maximizes the total contribution for the legislative authority. Assumption
1 together with the fact that ρ < 1 implies that γ > 1. This ensures that cmax
is well-deﬁned.
In order to deter the diﬀusion of the new technology, two conditions must
be satisﬁed. First, the contribution scheme made by the incumbent technology
lobby must satisfy the incentive constraint of the legislative authority. But
that may not be suﬃcient, because all the legislative authority can do is to
pass a regulation that taxes heavily the intermediate goods associated to the
new technology. Then it is up to the ﬁnal output producers to decide which
of the two technologies is more convenient to use based on the technological
superiority of the new technology (d) and on the sophistication of each of the
two technologies measured by the number of intermediate goods associated to
them. Next we explore how these constraints shape the equilibrium.
Let’s start by determining what is the contribution necessary to induce L
to implement a high sales tax for the new technology goods. Initially ai =
ae =¯ a. If L always implements τ0 = 0 and receives no contributions, its
value is b/(1 − β).L 0s value when implementing τ0 =¯ τ is W(¯ τ,¯ a,ci,0) =
b + ni0cio − s + β(¯ τ)EW(¯ τ,a 0,c 0
i,c 0
e). T h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo ft h el e g i s l a t i v ea u -
thority, EW(¯ τ,a 0,c 0
i,c 0
e), depends on the strategy proﬁle. As we shall see be-
low, in the relevant strategy proﬁles, lobby e never makes any contribution (i.e.
ce =0 )a n dl o b b yi always makes a per-member contingent contribution denoted
generally by ci. Further, assume that when the new technology experiences the
exogenous reduction in the marginal cost of production (i.e. ae =a), the policy
implemented by the legislative authority is τ0 =0 . Then,
W(¯ τ,¯ a,ci,0) =
1 − β(1 − β(¯ τ)µ/β)




ni0cio − S(¯ τ)
1 − β(τ)(1 − µ)
11It is useful to deﬁne the per member contribution level that makes L indif-
ferent between the two possible sales taxes by b c.T h e nb c is implicitly given by
the following expression:


















Candidate equilibrium 1- FAST DIFFUSION- Lobby i and e oﬀer ci =0a n d
ce = 0 in all the possible subgames, and the legislative authority implements
always τ0 =0 .
Proposition 2: Suppose that assumption 1 holds. If cmax < ˆ c, The fast
diﬀusion is a MPE of the game. Further in all the MPE, new technologies
diﬀuse fast (i.e. in the second period).
Proof: cmax is the contribution level that maximizes the total contribution of
a lobby (i.e. c∗n). ˆ c is the contribution level that makes the legislative authority
indiﬀerent between implementing τ0 =¯ τ and τ0 =0 .c max < ˆ c implies that there
is no contribution level that can induce the legislative authority to implement a
sales tax of τ0 =¯ τ. Therefore, τ0 = 0 is a dominant strategy for the legislative
authority in all the subgames. Since the contributions of the lobbies have no
eﬀect on the policy implemented, it is optimal for them to adopt strategies that
imply zero contributions in all the subgames such as the ones that compose the
fast diﬀusion equilibrium.¤
Discussion: In some circumstances, the maximum contribution that is feasi-
ble for the incumbent technology lobby is not suﬃcient to induce the legislative
authority to deter the diﬀusion of the new technology. What are the circum-
stances that make cmax < ˆ c?T h i si st h ec a s ew h e nβ − β(¯ τ) and/or S(¯ τ)a r e
large. That is, when implementing a high sales tax for the new technology re-
duces considerably the probability of reelection for L and/or when it is very hard
for L to implement such a policy because it does not have much independence.
However, even when the old technology lobby can propose L a contribution
scheme that induces her to legislate a high sales tax for the new technology,
it may still be the case that the new technology diﬀuses quickly. To see that,
let’s deﬁne as ˆ d the technological superiority of the new technology (d)t h a t
makes the ﬁnal output producers indiﬀerent between using the new and the old
technologies. If d is higher than ˆ d the technology used will be the new one, while











It is clear from this expression that ˆ d is a function of some exogenous (i.e.
ae) and of some endogenous (i.e. ni,n e and τ)v a r i a b l e s .
12It is also useful to deﬁne ¯ c implicitly by the following expression:
(1 + ¯ c)=d
α(1+ρ)−2ρ
ρ(1−α) (1 + ¯ τ)
ρ+α(ρ−α)
ρ(1−α)
¯ co is the maximum per member contribution that lobby i c a nm a k ei ns t a t e
¯ a,¯ τ and keep the market. When the per member contribution is larger than ¯ co,
the sophistication of the old technology measured by the number of ﬁrms that
operate producing intermediate goods associated to the old technology (ni)i s
too low for ﬁnal output producers to prefer using the old to the new technology.
Now we can study when the new technology will diﬀuse slowly.
Candidate equilibrium 2- SLOW DIFFUSION- Consider the following strat-
egy proﬁle: If the state of the economy is a,τ, each member of lobby i contributes
to the legislative authority b co units of output if it implements a sales tax τ0 = τ
on the price of new intermediate goods, and contributes 0 otherwise. Each mem-
ber of the lobby e contributes 0. Finally, the legislative authority implements a
sales tax τ0 = τ on the price of new intermediate goods if the contribution per
member of the lobby i belongs to the interval [ob c,o¯ c], and sets τ0 =0o t h e r w i s e .
If the state of the economy is diﬀerent to a,τ, neither the members of lobby i
nor the members of lobby e oﬀer any contribution to the legislative authority,
and the implemented sales tax is always τ0 =0 .
For this strategy proﬁle to be an equilibrium the following two conditions
must hold. First, when the state of the economy is a,τ and lobby i makes a per
member contribution of oˆ c, the sophistication of the old technology is suﬃcient
to induce the ﬁnal output producer to demand the old technology composite.
Condition 1:
d<(d(1 + ˆ c)))
−γ (1 + ¯ τ)
ρ+α(ρ−α)
ρ−α = b d(¯ a,¯ τ,b c,0)
Condition 2 states that when the marginal cost of producing the new in-
termediate goods declines to a
¯
, new intermediate goods producers will have
incentives to operate even if the current sales taxes they face are high (i.e.
τ =¯ τ). This condition ensures that, eventually, the new technology diﬀuses.
Condition 2:
b d(a,¯ τ,0,0) = (d)








Proposition 3: Under assumption 1 and conditions 1 and 2, if cmax > ˆ c, the
slow diﬀusion is a MPE of the game.
Proof: Let’s start for the subgames where the state is ¯ a,¯ τ. By the deﬁnition
of b c, The value of τ0 = 0 for the legislative authority is i) higher than its value
if the implemented sales tax is τ =¯ τ for any ci < b c, ii) lower for ci ∈ (b c,¯ c), and
iii) higher when ci > ¯ c. T h e s ef o l l o wf r o mt h ed e ﬁnitions of b c and ¯ c and imply
that, given the strategies of lobbies i and e, the best response of the legislative
authority is to implement τ0 =¯ τ whenever ci ∈ (b c,¯ c), and to implement τ0 =0
otherwise.
13Given the strategy of the legislative authority, the best response of lobby e
is to contribute ce =0 . Finally, since cmax > ˆ c, it is feasible for lobby i to have
a per-member contribution of o ∗ ˆ c. Further, it is optimal for lobby i to make
this contribution because if it does not make the contribution, next period tax
rate will be τ0 =0a n dni will be 0 from then on. (Need to check the condition
that Vi >o∗ ni(¯ τ,0)).
In state a,τ, condition 2 is suﬃcient to ensure that if no contributions are
made by any of the lobbies, all the ﬁnal output producers will use the new
technology. The conclusion holds a fortiori if ci > 0. This implies that the total
contribution by lobby i is 0 and that L prefers to implement τ0 =0f o ra l lce.
This same argument holds a fortiori in the state a,0.
Finally, in state a,0, it is straightforward to show that
b d(¯ a,0,0,0) = d−γ <d .
As in state a,τ, this implies that the total contribution to L by lobby i is 0,
that L implements τ0 = 0 from then on and that ci = ce =0i so p t i m a l .¤
For completeness, let’s discuss now the case where even when the producers
of the intermediate goods associated with the new technologies have learn how
to produce these eﬃciently (i.e. ae =a
¯
) the new technology does not diﬀuse.
Candidate equilibrium 3- NO DIFFUSION- Consider the following strategy
proﬁl e :I na l lt h es t a t e so ft h ew o r l d ,e a c hm e m b e ro ft h el o b b yi contributes
to L ˆ co units of output if he implements a sales tax τ0 =¯ τ on the price of
the new intermediate goods and contributes 0 otherwise. Each member of the
lobby e contributes 0. L passes regulation that sets τ0 =¯ τ if the contribution
per member of lobby i belongs to the interval [oˆ c,o¯ c]a n ds e t sτ0 =0o t h e r w i s e .
Proposition 4: Under assumption 1, if cmax > ˆ c and if the following condition
holds, the no diﬀusion equilibrium is the unique MPE of the game.
Condition 3:
d<(d(1 + ˆ c)))











Condition 3 ensures that in state (¯ τ,a
¯
) ﬁnal output ﬁrms prefer to use the
incumbent than the new intermediate goods. This is the critical condition to
show that the there is an equilibrium where the new technology does not dif-
fuse. To show this consider ﬁrst the state (¯ τ,¯ a). In these states, L is indiﬀerent
between the two sales tax rates given the contribution schemes, the members of
lobby I are better oﬀ contributing to the legislative authority and the new tech-
nology lobby cannot make any contribution to the legislative authority because
condition 3 ensures that no intermediate good producer will have incentives
to pay the operating costs necessary to operate and make contributions. The
same arguments are valid to show that the strategy proﬁle is optimal for all
the agents in state (¯ τ,a
¯
). Out of the equilibrium path, in states where τ =0 ,
the strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium because, i) given the strategy proﬁles, the
14legislative authority prefers to set τ =0 , ii) since τ =0 , both for ae equal to
¯ a and a
¯
, ﬁnal good ﬁrms ﬁnd more proﬁtable to use the new technology and
therefore there will be no demand for the intermediate goods associated to the
old technology (i.e. ni = 0) which will make any per member contribution of
the old technology lobby equally ineﬀective to induce a high sales tax. Given
that, the new technology lobby ﬁnds optimal to set ce =0 . ¤
2.3 Discussion and testable predictions
Our model has the following predictions:
• If in the sector there is no incumbent technology,6 nobody tries to deter
the diﬀusion of the new technology. Since the legislative authority has
no innate preference for any technology, the new technology will diﬀuse
quickly.
• If there is an incumbent technology, the incumbent technology lobby can
induce L to raise barriers to the diﬀusion of the new technology when either
the costs of bending the political constraints to pass regulation against the
new technology, S(¯ τ), are suﬃciently low, or the persistence in power of L
is not very aﬀected by regulating against the new technologies (i.e. β(¯ τ)
is high).
— In these sectoral/institutional environments, if the new technology
is much more productive than the incumbent technology (i.e. d>
ˆ d(¯ a,¯ τ,ˆ c,0)) the diﬀusion of the new technology will also diﬀuse fast.
— Instead, when the gap between the productivities of the new and
old technologies is not suﬃciently large (i.e. d<ˆ d(¯ a,¯ τ,ˆ c,0)) the
new technology diﬀuses slowly in these sectoral/institutional envi-
ronments.
One important question that we have to address when trying to bring these
predictions to the data is what are the empirical counterparts of a low level of
S(¯ τ)o rah i g hl e v e lo fβ(¯ τ). Next we bridge this conceptual gap by mapping
trade policy, the type of regime and the independence of the legislative authority
into our model.
Flexibility: It is natural to relate a low value of S(¯ τ)t ot h eﬂexibility of the
legislative authority when passing the legislations. In the empirical section, we
discuss one variable from the Banks data set that attempts to provide a direct
measure of this notion.
Trade policy also aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of political contributions from the
lobby of old technology producers for at least two reasons. First, lobbying eﬀorts
to deter the operation of ﬁrms that produce intermediate goods associated to
6Note that, the presence or absence of an incumbent technology is a universal property
that we will establish based on pure technological grounds.
15the new technology may be irrelevant in countries that adopt an open policy to
trade because ﬁnal output producers can import the new technology from some
foreign country.7 Second, in countries that have opted for an aggregate policy
of trade openness, it may be more costly for the legislative authority to pass
regulation that restricts the imports of new technology goods in one particular
sector than in countries that in general are more closed. In other words, trade
openness probably increases S(¯ τ). This interpretation of the model implies that
trade openness should accelerate the speed of diﬀusion of new technologies more
in sectors where there is an incumbent technology than in new sectors.
Type of Regime: In the model we have treated the discount factor as para-
metric. However, it is very easy to extend the model slightly to relate the two
values that it takes (β and β(¯ τ)) to the type of regime in the country. Let’s
consider the following two scenarios: In countries where legislative oﬃcials are
not elected democratically, the probability that they continue in power after the
regulations they pass every period may be quite independent from their actions.
Instead, in countries where they are democratically elected, whether they are
reelected or not is decided by the voters. This decision will depend, at least in
part, on whether the actions that the legislative authorities have taken while in
oﬃce have contributed to increase the voters’ welfare. Suppose that the voters
are the stock holders of the company that produces ﬁnal output.8 Note that in
the sectors where there is an old technology, the policy that maximizes the prof-
its of the ﬁnal output ﬁrm is clearly to not impose any barrier to the operation
of the new intermediate ﬁrms (i.e. τ0 = 0). In this sense, if voters are given the
option to punish a legislative authority that has reduced their welfare to obtain
ap r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt, they will tend to do so. Hence, in democratic regimes, there is
an extra cost of imposing barriers to the new technologies in the form of lower
probability of reelection or, equivalently, a lower discount factor. As we have
observed in the previous section, the prospect of a reduction in the discount
factor associated to the implementation of τ0 =¯ τ in a democratic regime tends
to make harder for the lobby i to induce L to implement such a policy. As a
result we should expect to observe that in sectors where there is an incumbent
technology, new technologies diﬀuse faster in democratic than in non-democratic
regimes.
2.4 Previous literature
Our model has two very natural predecessors. In their pioneer work Krusell and
Rios Rull [1996] develop an OLG voting model where old agents have a vested
interest in the old technologies while younger agents prefer the diﬀusion of a new
technology. In the context of this voting model, technologies do not diﬀuse until
7This eﬀect is emphasized by Holmes and Schmitz [2001].
8It is straightforward to extend this argument to settings where the majority of the voters
are workers employed in some other sector but that consume the ﬁnal output of a sector with
an incumbent technology. Then, the consumers’ welfare is aﬀected by the barrier to the new
technology because this raises the m,arginal cost of production (and the price) of the ﬁnal
output in the sector.
16young agents become a political majority. Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] argue
that political elites have incentives to block the diﬀusion of new technologies
because new technologies erode their political power. In their model, there is
an inverse-U shaped relationship between political competition and the blocking
activity. Also, external threats associated to blocking reduce the elites incentives
to block.
Both of these contributions are very interesting and we observe our model as
complementary to them. In this sense, there are at least four important dimen-
sions along which we extend the previous work. First, and most importantly, by
focusing on the sectoral outcomes (i.e. speed of diﬀusion of new technologies at
the sector level) instead than on the aggregate outcomes (i.e. income per capita)
we are able to make the crucial distinction between the eﬀect of institutions on
the sectors with and without an old technology. This distinction is the key to
the identiﬁcation scheme presented below.
At this point, it is relevant to make two related observations. First, that the
technologies in the model are embodied in intermediate goods. Second, that in
our model institutions shift the composition of investment (between investing
in old vs. new technologies), but in principle do not have any eﬀect on total
investment. In this sense, our model is consistent with Parente and Prescott
[2000] and Hsieh and Klenow [2003] who ﬁnd that the investment rate computed
in domestic currency is uncorrelated with income per capita.
A second distinction between ours and the previous models in the literature
is that our framework is ﬂexible enough to investigate theoretically the eﬀects
on technology diﬀusion of a richer set of institutional dimensions. Third, this
ﬂexibility allows us to avoid making some shortcuts made by the previous con-
tributions to this literature. In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson [2000] we
believe that most authorities do not have preferences deﬁned over the speed of
diﬀusion of technologies. This is in part the case because, in most instances,
individual technologies are too micro for elites to have always a direct preference
deﬁned over them. Interestingly, if elites have a preference for new technologies
not to diﬀuse, we should observe that institutions have an eﬀect on the speed of
diﬀusion of new technologies both in the old and in the new sectors. This ob-
servation could be used to test the theory proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson
[2000].
Fourth, in contrast to both the Krusell- Rios Rull and the Acemoglu-Robinson
modeling approaches, our paper emphasizes the special interest motivation of
barriers to technology diﬀusion. Special interest compete to propose an incen-
tive scheme to the legislative authority that induces her to regulate in favorable
terms. When modeling that, we recognize the strategic advantage of the pro-
ducers of the incumbent technology due to the fact that they can anticipate
the arrival of the new technology to the market and use their more established
organized structure to deter its diﬀusion. The legislative authority can then
increase the operating costs for the producers of the new technology. That is
the most it can do in our framework to deter the diﬀusion of the new technology.
We believe that this is a realistic feature of our model since the possibility of
operating in the informal sector is present in every regime.
17After the legislations have been passed, it is up to the consumers of the tech-
nologies to determine what to demand. Hence, our modeling strategy leads to
the recognition of and additional constraint that must be satisﬁed for the success
of lobbying eﬀorts in deterring the diﬀusion of a new technology. Namely, that
after the legislative authority has been oﬀered a contribution scheme that in-
duces her to pass the appropriate regulation, entry in the production of both new
and incumbent technologies is such that consumers still prefer to buy from the
old technology producers. This additional restriction adds a second prediction
that we do not test in this paper. Namely, that if a technology is suﬃciently
revolutionary (i.e. has a high relative productivity, d) it will diﬀuse quickly
independently of the political regime and/or the presence of an incumbent tech-
nology. Instead, for less revolutionary technologies (i.e. low d) the political
constraints that arise in the presence of an incumbent technology in a country
with inappropriate institutions may be binding.
3E m p i r i c s
Measurement: To test the predictions of the model we need to collect three
type of variables. First we need to have measures of technology diﬀusion of
various technologies in diﬀerent sectors and countries over time. We also need
to classify these sectors according to whether they are new (i.e. without an
incumbent technology) or old (i.e. there is a prior technology that the new
technology may substitute). Note that this variable is universal in the sense
that it is not country or time speciﬁc. Finally, the other determinant of the
success of the lobbying activity is the institutional setting. Hence, to identify
the role of lobbies in technology diﬀusion we also need to have information on
the relevant institutions/policies in a country over time.
The information on technology diﬀusion comes from our Historical Cross-
Country Technology Adoption (HCCTA) data set. This data set contains his-
torical data on the adoption of 25 major technologies over the last 215 years for
23 of the World’s leading industrial economies.
Table 1 contains a list of the technologies used in this analysis with the coun-
tries that are included in our data set which is basically the subset of developed
OECD economies. The technologies in our sample have been classiﬁed by us into
eight groups that cover (i) textiles production technologies, (ii) steel production
technologies, (iii) telecommunication, (iv) mass communication, (v) information
technology, (vi) transportation (rail-, road-, and airways), (vii) transportation
(shipping), and (viii) electricity. Table 1 lists the technologies in each group
sequentially, in the sense that the earliest technologies are listed ﬁrst. There is
one exception. That is, for information technology there is no such historical
sequence between industrial robots and PC’s.
As can be seen from Table 1, we use six diﬀerent proxies for the level of
technology adoption. The ﬁrst, applied for the data on steel technologies, mea-
sures the output produced using a production technology over the output pro-
duced with this and with earlier technologies. The second, used for textiles
18and shipping, measures capital shares rather than output shares. It measures
the fraction of a capital stock that is made up of equipment that embodies a
particular technology. Thirdly, for other technologies that are predominantly
used in production, like trucks and robots, we measure capital output ratios.
That is, we use the amount of equipment of a particular technology as a ratio of
real GDP. For some production technologies we do not have capital stock data
but only data on output produced, like ton-kilometers (TKM) of freight trans-
ported using various transportation methods. For those technologies we use
production to real GDP ratios. Our ﬁnal two measures normalize capital stocks
and consumption by the population rather than real GDP. Capital stocks per
capita are used for example for passenger cars per capita and mobile phones per
capita. Consumption per capita is used for mail, telegrams, as well as passenger
transportation variables.
In spite of the diﬀerent ways we measure technology adoption for the tech-
nologies in our sample, these measures have one important thing in common.
All of them are a proxy of the intensity with which a technology is used in a
particular economy at a given point in time.
We divide the sample of technologies in two groups: those technologies that
have a previous technology in our sample, and those that do not. The list of
technologies in the new sectors is composed by ring spindles, railroad, electricity
production and electric arc furnace, computers and robots. The Schumpeterian
view claims that in a way or another all the technologies have a more or less
direct predecessor. That can be argued in these cases too. However we consider
that the predecessors are suﬃciently distant technologically and in time for them
to have an incentive to lobby against the diﬀusion of the new technology.
Finally, we use ﬁve type of institutional/policy variables from the Banks data
set to characterize the environments where the model predicts that lobbying
eﬀorts may be eﬀective in deterring the diﬀusion of new technologies in old
sectors.
The legislative ﬂexibility is measured by Banks by assigning 4 diﬀerent val-
ues: (0) indicates that no legislature exists. (1) is assigned on three possible
bases: ﬁrst, legislative activity may be essentially of a “rubber stamp” char-
acter; second, domestic turmoil may make the implementation of legislation
impossible; third, the eﬀective executive may prevent the legislature from meet-
ing, or otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions. A value of
(2) for the ﬂexibility variable corresponds to a situation in which the executives
power substantially outweighs, but does not completely dominate that of the
legislature. Finally, a value of (3) is assigned when a signiﬁcant governmen-
tal autonomy is possessed by the legislature, including, typically, substantial
authority in regard to taxation and disbursement, and the power to override
executive vetoes of legislation.
As we have discussed in the previous section, trade openness is also a factor
that leads to high values of S(¯ τ). We measure openness with the exports plus
imports share in GDP.
The eﬀect of the legislation passed on the persistence in power depends on
the type of regime. We consider two types of regime variables. First, we classify
19regimes between those that are military and those that are not military. A mil-
itary regime is one that according to Banks is explicitly or implicitly controlled
by a military component of the nation’s population. A second dimension of
t h er e g i m ei st h et y p eo fe ﬀective executive. This refers to the individual who
exercises primary inﬂuence in the shaping of most major decisions aﬀecting the
nation’s internal and external aﬀairs. There are four possible types of eﬀective
executive: Monarch, President, Premier and other. The other category may
refer to a military eﬀective executive or to a situation in which the individual
in question (such as the party ﬁrst secretary in a Communist regime) holds no
formal governmental post, or to one in which no truly eﬀective national execu-
t i v ec a nb es a i dt oe x i s t .I no u rr e g r e s sions we include a set of dummies that
identify each of the four possible types of eﬀective executive.
For all the variables used in our analysis, we compute ﬁve year averages and
use non-overlapping data in our regressions. Taking these ﬁve year averages
increases the signal-to-noise ratio of our variables and, a priori, does not reduce
much of the relevant variation in the data since both technology diﬀusion and
institutional change are relatively high frequency phenomena.
Identiﬁcation: Let’s denote by yict our measure of technological diﬀusion for




it + yct + uict
The ﬁrst (y
f
it) can be interpreted as the level of diﬀusion for the ith technology
at time t in a frictionless environment (i.e. one where institutions are opti-
mal) while the other two terms (yct and uict) represent the deviations from this
frictionless pattern for technology i in country c at any given moment in time.
Diﬀerent technologies may have diﬀerent diﬀusion pattern in a frictionless world
for purely technological reasons. In our analysis, we will remove the ﬁrst com-
ponent (i.e. y
f
it) by including in the regressions a technology and time speciﬁc
time dummy.
The term yct represents (possibly time-varying) country speciﬁcf a c t o r s .T h e
literature on growth and aggregate diﬀusion of technologies has presented a long
list of country-speciﬁc factors that may aﬀect the speed of technology diﬀusion.
such as the human capital of the work force measured either by their schooling
or by their experience dealing with some related technologies, the degree of
development of the capital markets, some institutional variables such as the
ﬁscal system (i.e. proﬁts tax rate, existence of depreciation allowances, ...) or
other dimensions of institutions that determine the risk of expropriation by
the government or the rule of law, whether the country is involved in wars in a
moment in a particular time period, the distance to the countries from where the
technology is imported, the distance to the exports markets where the output
that results from using the technology is sold, etc.
Finally, the term uict captures the (possibly time-varying) technology coun-
try speciﬁc components of technology diﬀusion. This is the critical term for our
20empirical analysis because the theory developed in the previous sections has di-
rect implications about uict. Speciﬁcally, it predicts that for those technologies
where there is a technological predecessor, the presence of certain institutions
may lead to successful lobbying eﬀorts that slowdown the diﬀusion of new tech-
nologies; that is, lead to lower levels of uict. In contrast, when the new technol-
ogy does not have a technological predecessor, these same institutions should
not have an eﬀect on the speed of diﬀusion of the new technology and therefore
uict should not be aﬀected.
To identify the eﬀect of lobbies in the data, we make the assumption that
any diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions on the diﬀusion of new technologies in new
vs. old sectors, after controlling for the time and technology speciﬁc dummies,
is due to the eﬀects of lobbies.
This identiﬁcation strategy may, a priori, have two potential problems. First,
and most importantly, there may be some variable, z, omitted in our regression
that is correlated to our measure of institutions that has an asymmetric eﬀect
in the diﬀusion of diﬀerent technologies. For this to be an important concern,
there must be a reason why, a priori, z has a diﬀerent eﬀect in the technolo-
gies that have a predecessor than in those that do not. Given the diversity of
technologies in our sample and their homogenous distribution over time and
sectors we believe that it is quite diﬃcult to come out with one such variable.
In any case, we try to make the case that eﬀectively omitted variable bias is
not a problem for our identiﬁcation by allowing for some of the variables that a
priori might aﬀect an eﬀect on the speed of diﬀusion of technologies to have a
diﬀerential eﬀect in our two groups of innovations.
A second potential pitfall of our identiﬁcation strategy is that of reverse
causality. This would happen if the speed of diﬀusion in the sectors with an
incumbent technology (but not on the sectors without one) led to a democratic
regime or to a legislative system where the authorities had no legislative inde-
pendence. We believe that this is not an important concern for two reasons.
First because, since we study the diﬀusion of quite narrowly deﬁned technolo-
gies, it is highly unlikely that these micro phenomena have an eﬀect on the
political regime. Second, even if they could change the political system, our
identiﬁcation strategy would be safe as long as it is not the case that only the
diﬀusion of technologies in the sectors with technological incumbents aﬀects the
transformation of institutions. This asymmetry seems to us even less likely to
take place.
Regressions: The basic regression we run has the following form:
yict = α0 + αDit + β1Xct + β2Rct + β3Ii ∗ Rct + ²ict. (13)
α0 is a constant. Dit denotes a set of time and technology speciﬁc dummies.
As explained above, these dummies remove the diﬀerences in the diﬀusion pat-
terns that have the technologies for purely technological reasons. Xct is a set
of controls that includes the level of income per capita, various measures of
educational enrollment, and the production of electricity over real GDP. There
are various reasons for these variables to have an independent eﬀect on the dif-
fusion of the technologies in our sample. The logarithm of real GDP per capita
21captures both income eﬀects that inherently contribute to the diﬀerent rates of
technology adoption as well as endowment diﬀerences across countries that are
omitted in the other variables. Human capital endowments, are measured by
the enrollment rates in primary and secondary schooling computed by us and
by the world bank (for the years after 1970). Low energy prices measured by
the intensity of electricity production may also accelerate the adoption of new
technologies.
Rct represents the set of institutional and policy variables. Remember that
these contain two measures of the political cost for legislators of raising barriers
to the diﬀusion of the new technology (S (τ)) - legislative ﬂexibility and trade
openness- and two measures of the type of regime. Namely, a dummy that
measures whether the regime is military and some dummies that capture the
type of eﬀective executive. Recall that the type of regime has an eﬀect on the
sensitivity of the legislative’s authority discount factor to the barriers raised
(β (τ)).
The fourth set of regressors in (13) (Ii ∗Rct) interacts the institutional vari-
ables (Rct) with a dummy variable for the technologies that have a predecessor
technology (Ii). β3 is the critical vector of coeﬃcients for the identiﬁcation of
the role of lobbying activity on technology diﬀusion. ²ict is a zero mean error
term.
Table 2 reports the coeﬃcient estimates. Each column corresponds to a dif-
ferent regression. In all the regressions the dependent variable is the level of
technology diﬀusion (yict). All the regressions include the time and technology
speciﬁc dummies (Dit). Column 1 corresponds to a basic regression with only
Xct and Rct as regressors. There we can observe that income per capita, the
enrollment rates and the intensity of electricity production are positively associ-
ated to the level of technology diﬀusion. The positive coeﬃcient of enrollment,
however, only holds for enrollment before 1970. In the institutional and pol-
icy variables, trade openness and legislative ﬂexibility are partially uncorrelated
to technology diﬀusion while having “other” regime is negatively correlated to
technology diﬀusion.
Column 2 reports the coeﬃcients from regression (13). In this regression
we can also observe the positive association between technology diﬀusion and
income per capita, enrollment (before 1970) and electricity production over
GDP.
More interesting are the coeﬃcients of Rct and specially the coeﬃcients that
capture the diﬀerential eﬀect that the institutions in Rct have on the diﬀusion of
the technologies with a predecessor. Allowing for this diﬀerential eﬀect aﬀects
some of the coeﬃcients of Rct. In particular, the coeﬃcients of trade openness
and the dummies for the president executive become negative while the coeﬃ-
cient for the military regime dummy becomes positive.
Recall that our strategy to identify the eﬀect of lobbies on technology dif-
fusion is based on the diﬀerential eﬀect that the institutional variables in Rct
should have, according to the theory, on the diﬀusion of technologies with and
without a predecessor. Speciﬁcally, the theory predicts that in sectors with an
incumbent technology, countries with high cost of raising barriers (S (τ)) and
22with a high intertemporal punishment from raising barriers (low β (τ)) should
experience faster diﬀusion of technologies than in countries where legislators do
not face these static and dynamic costs from raising barriers against the diﬀu-
sion of new technologies. According to our model, lobbying activity is irrelevant
for the diﬀusion of technologies without a predecessor. Hence, we should ob-
serve a signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect of the variables in Rct for the diﬀusion of
the technologies with predecessor.
These predictions are supported by the estimates from the second regres-
sion. There we can see that trade openness has a additional signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor. Indeed, it is only for
these technologies that trade openness is associated positively with technology
diﬀusion.
The other proxy for the static political costs of raising diﬀusion barriers for
the legislative authority is the legislative ﬂexibility variable. Here, consistently
with the theory, we also observe that a high degree of legislative ﬂexibility
reduces the speed of diﬀusion of the technologies with a predecessor. again, this
diﬀerential eﬀect for this set of technologies is highly signiﬁcant.
Similarly, we can observe in the second column that the regime variables
also have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the diﬀusion of technologies with predecessor
consistent with the relevance of lobbying in slowing down the speed of diﬀusion
of technologies. Speciﬁcally, technologies with a predecessor diﬀuse more slowly
than technologies without one in military regimes and in countries where the
eﬀective executive is not a president, a monarch or a premier
As discussed above, we believe that we can interpret these results as evidence
of a causal negative eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion. This interpretation
of the diﬀerential correlation between institutions and diﬀusion for the technolo-
gies with predecessor is motivated by how unlikely it is to ﬁnd omitted variables
that drive the correlation. Good governments, climate, unmeasured factors,
high TFP,... and all the usual suspects that can explain why we ﬁnd positive
correlation between institutions and development levels fail to explain why the
eﬀect of the relevant institutional variables is stronger for technologies with a
predecessor. This failure is accentuated by two observations: First, the fact that
we can identify simultaneously the diﬀerential eﬀect of all the institutional vari-
ables on the diﬀusion of the technologies with a predecessor raises the hurdle for
the potential omitted variables since, to account for the estimated coeﬃcients,
they must be appropriately correlated with all the variables in Rct.S e c o n d ,
t h ef a c tt h a tt h es i g no ft h ee ﬀect of many of the variables in Rct on the dif-
fusion of technologies without a predecessor technology is diﬀerent than for the
technologies with a predecessor puts some additional contraints on the variance
and correlations of the omitted variables with the endogenous and exogenous
variables necessary to account for the estimated coeﬃcients.
Similar arguments lead to the conclusion that it is unlikely that reverse
causality drives the observed diﬀerential correlation between technology diﬀu-
sion for technologies with predecessor technologies and the institutional vari-
ables in Rct. In addition, it is important to note that the technologies we are
studying are quite micro and therefore the eﬀect of their diﬀusion (or lack of)
23in aggregate macro variables such as GDP, the labor market outcomes and so
on is quite limited.
The estimated eﬀect of lobbies on technology diﬀusion, in addition to being
statistically signiﬁcant, is quantitatively relevant. The standard deviation of the
diﬀusion level of the technologies with a predecessor after removing the eﬀect of
the technology-time dummies is 0.78. The dispersion induced by the estimated
eﬀect of the diﬀerential eﬀect of institutional/policy variables on the diﬀusion of
technologies with a predecessor is 0.29. This means that the estimated eﬀect of
lobbies on technology diﬀusion is 37 percent of the observed standard deviation
in technology diﬀusion.
In the rest of table 2, we try to increase our conﬁdence on the robustness of
the estimated diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions on the diﬀusion of technologies
with a predecessor. In column 3 we include country ﬁxed eﬀects as regres-
s o r s .T h i sd o e sn o ta ﬀect whatsoever the estimates of the interaction between
institutions and the dummies for the technologies with predecessors.
Columns 4 and 5 allow for a diﬀerential eﬀect of the controls in Xct (in-
come per capita, enrollment and electricity production) on the diﬀusion of the
technologies with a predecessor. The diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions on the
diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor is robust to the presence of diﬀer-
ential controls. It is interesting to note that, for the technologies without a
predecessor, the institutional variables either do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect or
the coeﬃcient has the opposite sign than for the interaction between the insti-
tutions and the predecessor technology dummy. This observation reinforces our
believes in the causal interpretation of the relationship between institutions and
the diﬀusion of technologies with a predecessor.
Finally, in columns 6 and 7 we also allow for a country ﬁxed eﬀects to have a
diﬀerent eﬀect on the technologies with and without a predecessor. This again
does not aﬀect by-and-large the signiﬁcance of the estimates of the interactions
between institutions and the predecessor technology dummy. The only rele-
vant variable that becomes insigniﬁcant after allowing for diﬀerent eﬀects of the
country dummies is the interaction between trade openness and the predecessor
dummy.
In addition to providing evidence on the slowdown in the speed of diﬀusion
of technologies induced by lobbies, the ﬁndings of this paper also illustrate one
channel by which institutions aﬀect development. Namely, institutions aﬀect
the parties incentives to engage in lobbying activities, lobbying slows down
technology diﬀusion and technology adoption aﬀects crucially development. The
empirical identiﬁcation of this mechanism is a contribution to the institutions
and growth literature.
This literature has followed two routes to progress: In standard regression
analysis, it has tried to identify the eﬀect of institutions on income per capita
by controlling for elements other than institutions that may aﬀect income per
capita diﬀerences. This route has typically been unsuccessful because institu-
tions become insigniﬁcant after a few reasonable controls are included in the
regression. A second route has argued that attenuation bias is responsible for
this insigniﬁcance and has tried to ﬁnd good instruments of institutions. This
24approach has been more successful but it is still not clear whether the proposed
instruments are truly valid.
This paper provides an alternative route to establish empirically the link
between institutions and development. This approach hinges on two pillars.
First, the use of measures of diﬀusion for various technologies as dependent
variable. Second, the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of institutions by interacting
institutions to a relevant ex-ante classiﬁcation of technologies.
4 Conclusion
This paper has established theoretically and empirically the eﬀect that lobbies
have on technology diﬀusion. We have observed that lobbies signiﬁcantly slow
down the speed of diﬀusion of technologies. Further, our results provide evi-
dence of a speciﬁc channel by which certain institutions/policies such as having
independent legislative authorities, military or non-democatic regimes or closed
economies aﬀect development. Speciﬁcally, these institutions and policies make
easier for lobbies to induce the legislative authorities to raise barriers to the
diﬀusion of new (and superior) technologies.
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Table 1. Countries and technologies covered 
Period covered: 1788 – 2001 
 Countries    Technology  measures 
1. Australia  (AUS)  I. Textiles 
2. Austria  (AUT)  1.  Fraction of spindles that are ring spindles 
3. Belgium  (BEL)  II.  Steel 
4. Canada  (CAN)  2.  Fraction of tonnage of steel produced using Open Hearth furnaces 
over steel producer with this and older technologies.† 
5. Denmark  (DNK)  3.  Fraction of tonnage of steel produced using Blast Oxygen furnaces 
over steel producer with this and older technologies.‡ 
6. Finland  (FIN)  4.  Fraction of tonnage of steel produced using Electric Arc furnaces 
over steel producer with this and older technologies.↑ 
7. France  (FRA)  III.  Telecommunication 
8. Germany  (DEU)  5.  (Log.) Mail per capita 
9. Greece  (GRC)  6.   (Log.) Telegrams per capita 
10. Iceland  (ISL)  7.  (Log.) Telephones per capita 
11. Ireland  (IRL)  8.  (Log.) Mobile phones per capita 
12. Italy  (ITA)  IV.  Mass communication 
13. Japan  (JPN)  9.  (Log.) Newspapers per capita 
14. Luxembourg  (LUX)  10.  (Log.) Radios per capita 
15. Netherlands  (NLD)  11.  (Log.) Televisions per capita 
16. New  Zealand  (NZL)  V.  Information Technology 
17. Norway  (NOR)  12.  (Log.) Personal computers per capita 
18. Portugal  (PRT)  13.  (Log.) Industrial robots per unit of real GDP 
19. Spain  (ESP)  VI.  Transportation (rail, road-, and airways) 
20. Sweden  (SWE)  14.  (Log.) Freight traffic on railways (TKMs) per unit of real GDP 
21. Switzerland  (CHE)  15.  (Log.) Passenger traffic on railways (PKMs) per capita 
22. United  Kingdom  (GBR)  16.  (Log.) Trucks per unit of GDP 
23. United  States  (USA)  17.  (Log.) Passenger cars per capita 
    18.  (Log.) Aviation cargo (TKMs) per unit of real GDP 
    19.  (Log.) Aviation passengers (PKMs) per capita 
   VII.  Transportation (shipping) 
    20.  Fraction of merchant fleet (tonnage) made up of steam and 
motorships 
   VIII. Electricity 
    21.  MWhr of electricity produced per unit of real GDP 
† Older technologies for open hearth are acid and basic Bessemer and other. ‡  Older technologies for  blast 
oxygen are open hearth, basic and acid Bessemer and other. ↑ Older  technologies for Electric arc furnace 
are the older technologies for blast oxygen plus blast oxygen. Variable I II III IV V VI VII
Controls (Xct)
ln(RGDPpc) 1.01 1.05 0.91 0.62 0.53 0.94 0.71
(22.25) (23.54) (10.14) (10.16) (5.60) (10.88) (5.92)
Prim.enr. 70- 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.46
(3.91) (4.10) (2.85) (2.84) (2.08) (2.89) (2.86)
Sec.enr. 70- 0.20 0.20 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02
(2.35) (2.33) (-0.09) (1.38) (-0.05) (-0.41) (-0.12)
Prim.enr. 70+ 0.31 0.29 -0.26 0.71 0.17 -0.19 -0.05
(0.93) (0.90) (-0.76) (1.44) (0.34) (-0.57) (-0.10)
Sec.enr. 70+ -0.19 -0.25 -0.44 0.64 0.51 -0.37 -0.06
(-0.67) (-0.93) (-1.52) (1.51) (1.20) (-1.34) (-0.14)
ln(MWHR) 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.14 0.31 0.30 0.18
(7.96) (8.66) (6.15) (5.24) (5.88) (6.20) (2.74)
Policy/Institut (Rct)
Openness 0.02 -0.39 -0.31 -0.25 -0.19 -0.02 -0.01
(0.19) (-3.78) (-2.66) (-2.36) (-1.64) (-0.18) (-0.09)
Legislative Flexibility 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.65) (1.28) (0.08) (2.33) (1.11) (0.70) (0.84)
Mil.Reg -0.02 0.45 0.09 0.08 -0.24 -0.02 -0.04
(-0.24) (3.58) (0.62) (0.60) (-1.64) (-0.12) (-0.27)
Ex.Mon. 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.57 0.57 0.32 0.40
(3.79) (2.90) (2.81) (3.69) (3.43) (1.86) (2.27)
Ex.Pres 0.05 -0.33 -0.49 -0.11 -0.29 -0.06 -0.06
(1.04) (-5.00) (-4.65) (-1.58) (-2.81) (-0.48) (-0.44)
Ex.Other -0.28 -0.18 0.23 0.00 0.38 -0.07 -0.05
(-5.08) (-2.45) (1.80) (-0.01) (3.00) (-0.42) (-0.33)
Controls*Incumb.Tech. (Xct*I)
ln(RGDPpc) * Incumb.Tech. 0.83 0.82 0.46
(9.96) (9.99) (2.65)
Prim.enr. 70- * Incumb.Tech. 0.09 0.04 -0.26
(0.48) (0.23) (-1.17)
Sec.enr. 70- * Incumb.Tech. -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.18)
Prim.enr. 70+ * Incumb.Tech. -0.77 -0.78 -0.29
(-1.21) (-1.26) (-0.44)
Sec.enr. 70+ * Incumb.Tech. -1.50 -1.51 -0.52
(-2.75) (-2.85) (-0.92)
ln(MWHR) * Incumb.Tech. 0.04 0.03 0.24
(1.00) (0.93) (2.49)
Institut*Incumb.Tech. (Rct*I)
Openess * Incumb.Tech. 0.87 0.87 0.56 0.59 0.25 0.23
(6.16) (6.32) (3.73) (3.96) (1.32) (1.21)
Legislat. Eff. * Incumb.Tech. -0.08 -0.06 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08
(-4.18) (-3.11) (-6.60) (-5.37) (-3.61) (-3.63)
Mil.Reg * Incumb.Tech. -0.92 -0.80 -0.22 -0.13 -0.55 -0.47
(-5.65) (-5.00) (-1.29) (-0.77) (-2.59) (-2.17)
Ex.Mon. * Incumb.Tech. 0.59 0.60 0.42 0.44 0.96 0.78
(1.74) (1.80) (1.26) (1.33) (2.81) (2.24)
Ex.Pres * Incumb.Tech. 0.79 0.81 0.38 0.42 0.00 0.00
(8.90) (9.33) (3.90) (4.38) (0.02) (0.01)
Ex.Other * Incumb.Tech. -0.20 -0.18 -0.58 -0.56 0.26 0.15
(-2.05) (-1.91) (-5.61) (-5.54) (1.19) (0.66)
Country Dummies No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies * Incumb.Tech. No No No No No Yes Yes
No. of obs. 2915 2915 2915 2915 2915 2915 2915
R
2 (within) 0.351 0.390 0.426 0.416 0.451 0.480 0.482
Table 2: Dependent variable: Technology Diffusion (yict)